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PUTTING AN END TO THE SPECULATIVE JURY:
LOUISIANA v. HADDAD
On April 29, 1997, Sergeant Brady Buckley ("Buckley")
observed a vehicle heading in the wrong direction on a one-
way exit ramp to the 1-10 Service Road in Metairie, Louisiana.1
Buckley pursued the vehicle with the intention of ticketing the
driver, Lionel Smith ("Smith"), for driving the wrong way on
a one-way street and for speeding.'
After stopping the car, Buckley ordered Smith out of the
vehicle and asked Smith to produce the vehicle's registration
papers.3 Smith replied that he did not know where the papers
were located.4 As Buckley escorted Smith back to the vehicle
to retrieve the papers, an altercation ensued between Buckley
and the defendant, Anwar Haddad ("defendant"), who had been
sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. However, the facts
are in dispute as to exactly what happened.'
1. See Louisiana v. Haddad, 733 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999). Buckley was
employed with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office. See id. According to Buckley, who was
driving north on North Causeway, the vehicle made a U-turn in front of Buckley's vehicle and
proceeded north on North Causeway at a high rate of speed. See id.
2. See id. The facts are unclear on this point. Buckley testified that as the vehicle pro-
ceeded north on North Causeway, the driver made erratic lane changes until, finally, the vehicle
turned into the parking lot at Lakeside Shopping Center and stopped. See id. The passen-
ger/defendant maintained that he was "kind of sleeping" at the time but did remember Smith
making "crazy turns." Original Application on Behalf of Anwar Haddad Defendant/Applicant
at 13, Louisiana v. Haddad, 733 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-K-1272) [herein-
after Applicant's Brief]. However, the defendant did not dispute Buckley's allegation that Smith
was in violation of several traffic violations. See id.,
3. See Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 2.
4. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 664. Smith stated that he did not know where the registration
was located because the vehicle belonged to Smith's girlfriend. See id. The defendant's brother,
Samir, later testified that the vehicle belonged to Samir's girlfriend. See id.
5. According to Buckley, as he and Smith approached the vehicle, the defendant, Haddad,
while seated in the passenger seat, pulled a weapon from his waistband. See Applicant's Brief,
supra note 2, at 2. Buckley then drew his weapon and ordered the defendant to "freeze." See
Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 664. Upon that command, the defendant dropped the gun onto the floor
of the vehicle. See id. The defendant was handcuffed and taken to the police unit. See id.
In contrast, the defendant testified that as Smith stopped the vehicle, Smith tossed the gun to
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After the altercation, the defendant was ordered to exit
the vehicle and lie face down on the ground.' After placing the
defendant in handcuffs, Buckley retrieved a loaded .380 Lorcin
semi-automatic handgun from inside the vehicle.7 A police
search revealed that the gun was listed as stolen.' The search
also revealed that the defendant had outstanding attachments
and prior felony convictions.9 The defendant was charged with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.'°
Prior to jury selection in Haddad's second trial, Smith,
when called as a witness at the first trial, stated for the record
that he had decided to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and was excused from testifying
by the court. " At trial, the defense argued that because several
witnesses testified to Smith's involvement in the events leading
up to the defendant's arrest, the jury would be left to speculate
as to why the defendant did not call Smith as a witness. 2 There
the defendant and advised the defendant to run. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665. However, the
defendant instead placed the gun beside his leg and informed Buckley that there was a gun in the
car. See id. According to the defendant, Buckley was unaware that a gun was in the vehicle up
to this point. See id.
The defendant also maintained Buckley never pulled his weapon, never ordered the defendant
to "freeze," and did not order the defendant to place his hands on the interior ceiling of the
vehicle. See Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 2-3. Interestingly enough, according to the
defendant, Buckley's police report failed to mention that Buckley was forced to draw his
weapon, that Buckley ordered the defendant to place his hand's on the ceiling of the vehicle, or
that Lionel Smith was used as a "human shield." See Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 3.




10. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 664. Later, on April 21, 1998, the defendant was charged
with a second count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See id. at 663. The noted
case represents the second trial on count one of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See
id. at 663-64.
1I. See id at 665. During the first trial, Smith invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege on
the witness stand in the presence of the jury. See Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 7. The jury
in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict as to count one, but returned a verdict of not guilty
as to count two; count one and two were charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 663.
12. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665. Defense counsel also raised several objections to
inferences the prosecution made to the jury. See id. Specifically, the prosecution, in closing
argument, commented to the jury:
[The defendant] talks about ... Lionel Smith... driving erratic [sic] and Lionel Smith is doing this,
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fore, the defense asserted that the defendant was entitled to
an instruction which would neutralize any inference the jury
might draw from the failure of Smith to testify. 3 The trial court
noted the defendant's objection, but did not give the special
charge to the jury.14
On appeal, the defendant argued that the denial of the
"neutralizing" charge constituted reversible error and denied
the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses
at trial.'5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana held
that it is not reversible error when a court refrains to give a
"neutralizing" instruction because the verdict is unaffected
when (1) a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege and
(2) the court declines to give the "neutralizing" instruction.
Louisiana v. Haddad, 733 So. 2d 662, 667 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1999).
Before the noted case, neither the Louisiana Supreme Court,
nor the Louisiana appellate court had directly addressed the
issue raised in Haddad. 6 However, the United States Supreme
Court has established that, upon proper request, the Fifth
Amendment requires a trial judge to instruct the jury that no
and Lionel Smith must be the bad guy .... And what else is interesting? Lionel Smith can have
a gun, because he's not a convicted felon .... So why is Lionel Smith going to dump the gun? Is
that reasonable? Ladies and gentlemen, that's what it comes back to. When you go in the jury
room, ask yourself, 'What's reasonable, and who do I believe?'
Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 14 (citing Transcript, Pages 93-94)(emphasis added)(bold
omitted).
13. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665.
14. See id. Instead, the jury was instructed that:
"In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may consider their [sic] ability and opportunity to
observe and remember the matter about which they [sic] have testified, their [sic] manner while
testifying, any reason they [sic] may have for testifying in favor or against the State or defendant,
and the extent to which their [sic] testimony is supported or contradicted by other evidence."
Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 16.
The jury was also told that "in closing arguments, the attorneys are permitted to present for
your consideration their contentions regarding what the evidence has shown or not shown and
what conclusions they think may be drawn from the evidence .. " Id. The trial court's instruc-
tions also told the jury "[y]ou must determine the facts only from the evidence presented. The
evidence which you should consider consists of the testimony of witnesses and any other evi-
dence which the Court has permitted the parties to introduce." Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 666.
Finally, the trial judge gave general instructions as set forth in the Louisiana Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure. See id. (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 802 (West 1998)).
15. See Applicant's Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
16. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 666.
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adverse inference can be drawn from a defendant's failure to
testify. 
17
In Carter v. Kentucky, 8 the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that "the inclusion of the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment 'reflects many [of
the nation's] fundamental values and ... our unwillingness
to subject those suspected of a crime to ... self-accusation,
perjury or contempt.""' 9 The Court stated that the "Constitution
guarantees that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from"
the use of the Fifth Amendment privilege.2 °
Moreover, the Court in Carter recognized that even without
adverse comment, ajury may still draw inferences from a defen-
dant's silence.2 The jury instruction, the Court reasoned, is
a powerful weapon that can be used to protect the constitutional
privilege to the extent that jury instructions help prevent jury
speculation.22 Therefore, the trial judge has an affirmative
duty to give a neutralizing instruction when a defendant seeks
its employment to reducejury speculation "as to why a defendant
stands mute in the face of a criminal accusation."23 The Court
also held that the failure to limit the jury's speculation "was
an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege."
24
17. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303-04 (1981), cited in Haddad, 733 So. 2d at
665.
18. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
19. See id. at 299 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
20. See id. at 305.
21. See id. at 301. The Court reasoned that ajury can be expected to notice a defendant's
failure to testify, and without a limiting instruction, the jury will undoubtedly speculate about
the incriminating inferences that can be drawn from the defendant's silence. See id. at 304; see
also United States v. Bain, 596 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that the failure to give a
limiting instruction constituted reversible error); United States v. English, 409 F.2d 200,201 (3d
Cir. 1969) (finding reversible error because the instructions did not reach the specific point that
no presumption arises against a defendant from his failure to testify). Furthermore, the Court
recognized that ajury can derive significant additional guidance from the requested neutralizing
instruction. See Carter, 450 U.S. at 304.
22. See Carter, 450 U.S. at 303.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 305.
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Since Carter, it has been clear that a neutralizing instruc-
tion is required when the defendant invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment and does not testify.25 However, there is little jurispru-
dence in support of the contention that a neutralizing instruction
is required when a witness does not testify.26 However, some
federal courts have approved of the use of a neutralizing instruc-
tion when a witness has invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege.27
For example, in Bowles v. United States28 , the court reasoned
that "a neutralizing instruction [is] . .. calculated to reduce
the danger that the jury will in fact draw a negative inference
from the absence of such a witness."29 Thus, the court held
25. Yet, this rule is not absolute. Three years after Carter, the U.S. Court of Appeals, in
Richardson v. Lucas, upheld a conviction even though the neutralizing instruction was not given
by the trial judge. See Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753,756 (5th Cir. 1984), cited in Haddad,
733 So. 2d at 667. In Richardson, there was overwhelming evidence placing the defendant at
the scene of the crime. See id. at 755, 756. At trial, two witnesses positively identified the
defendant as the person who committed the charged offense. See id. at 756. Although the
defendant did not testify after invoking the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,
he did state in the presence of the jury that he was not in town when the crime occurred. See
Richardson, 741 F.2d at 756 n.3. These claims were made by the defendant during defense
counsel's direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. See id. at 756 n.3.
The court reasoned that the defendant's failure to testify, especially in view of his constant
claims that the witnesses were lying, had no effect on the jury's appraisal of the witnesses'
credibility. See id. at 756. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convic-
tion and was "so overwhelming as to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id Thus, there
was "no reasonable possibility that the giving of a 'failure to testify' instruction would have
affected the verdict of guilty for Richardson." Id.
26. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665 (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 665-66; see also United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975)
(finding that the trial court gave a proper neutralizing instruction when the defendant sought to
put a witness on the stand to compel the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege), cited in
Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 666; Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc)
(finding that a defendant may request a neutralizing instruction which directs the jury not to draw
improper inferences from the absence of the defendant's testimony), cited in Haddad, 733 So.
2d at 665.
28. 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
29. See Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542. Like in the noted case, the witness in Bowles invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination out of the presence of the jury. See id. at 541. However,
unlike the noted case, neither the defense nor the prosecution in Bowles requested the neutraliz-
ing instruction. See id.
The defendant in Bowles requested that the judge inform the jury that the witness invoked the
privilege, but the request was properly refused. See id. at 541. See generally Martin, 526 F.2d
at 487 (holding that it is improper to force a witness to the stand and compel him to take the Fifth
1999] 787
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that, had the defendant requested a neutralizing instruction,
it would have been erroneous to refuse to grant the request.3"
However, because a neutralizing instruction was not requested,
the defendant's conviction was affirmed.3'
In United States v. Martin,32 a federal circuit court again
approved of the use of a neutralizing instruction.33 The Martin
court maintained that the use of a neutralizing instruction was
proper because the instruction "served to put the entire matter
in context" for the jury.3 4 Significantly, the Martin court rea-
in the presence of the jury); United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974)
(counsel was prevented from calling a witness to the stand to invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege in the presence of the jury); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.
1973) (holding that a court has discretion to prohibit a witness from taking the stand if it appears
that the witness intends to claim a privilege as to essentially all questions); Morrison v. United
States, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that it is appropriate for ajudge to instruct
thejury that a witness was not called to testify because the witness invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege when both counsels agree), cited in Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665; Louisiana v. Gerard,
685 So. 2d 253, 259 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a witness is not required to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination in presence ofjury when injurious disclosures may result),
cited in Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665; State v. Willie, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1337-38 (La. 1990)
(discussing the impropriety of calling a witness before the jury for the exclusive purpose of
having the witness invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege), cited in Haddad,.733 So. 2d at 665;
State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822, 830 (La. 1975) (denying a request to have a subpoenaed witness
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury), cited in Haddad, 733 So. 2d
at 665.
30. See Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542.
31. See id. Judge Wright, dissenting, argued that the lack of a neutralizing instruction meant
that the jury was allowed to draw a negative inference. See id. at 546 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Judge Wright also argued that if a neutralizing instruction had been given, it is reasonable to
believe that at least onejuror might have been unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. See id. Thus, regardless of whether or not the
parties requested the neutralizing instruction, a new trial must be held. See id.
Chief Justice Bazelon also dissented and held that the failure of the trial court to issue a
neutralizing instruction to the jury was too important to be overlooked. Bowles, 439 F.2d at 546
(Bazelon, C. J., dissenting). The Chief Justice found this to be especially true when the record
indicated that the trial court itself "was aware that no inference unfavorable to the defendant
should be drawn" by a witness's failure to testify. Id.
32. 526 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1975).
33. See Martin, 526 F.2d at 487. The facts in Martin bear a striking resemblance to those
in the noted case: not only was there conflicting testimony, but there were two trials as well.
See id. at 486. At the first trial, the witness, who could have confirmed or denied the defendant's
version of the events, invoked the privilege in front of the jury, and the jury was unable to reach
a verdict. See id.
In contrast, at the second trial, the trial judge refused to allow the witness to invoke the privi-
lege in front of the jury. See id. The second Martin jury convicted the defendant. See id
34. Id. at 487.
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soned that the neutralizing instruction given by the trial judge
helped prevent the jury from drawing negative inferences from
the fact that the witness chose to assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege and did not testify.
3 5
Although neither the Louisiana Supreme Court nor the
Louisiana appellate courts have directly addressed the question
of whether a defendant is entitled to a neutralizing instruction
when a witness invokes a Fifth Amendment privilege, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana, like the Bowles and Martin
courts, has approved the use of a neutralizing instruction.36
For example, in Louisiana v. Gerard,37 the defendant argued
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to
the relevance of a co-defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.3" The Gerard court
rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's holding
by noting that "the trial judge instructed the jury 'to draw no
inference for or against either the state or the defendant from
the fact that certain persons were mentioned or called as wit-
nesses but did not actually testify.'
39
Conversely, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
in Haddad abandoned the Gerard position in the noted case
with regard to the proper use of neutralizing instructions when
a witness opts not to testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The court in Haddad noted the rule established by
the United States Supreme Court in Carter that, upon proper
request, a neutralizing instruction is required when a defendant
does not testify.4" The Haddad court also noted Martin and
Bowles which approved of the use of neutralizing instructions
35. See Martin, 526 F.2d at 487. The instructions given to the Martin jury were as follows:
There has been testimony in this case about an informant .... As a result of a hearing held outside
the presence of the jury, the Court has determined [the informant] is not available to be called as a
witness by either side in this case. The jury may not draw any inference from the fact that [the
informant] did not appear as a witness in this case.
Id. at 486-87.
36. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 666.
37. 685 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
38. See Gerard, 685 So. 2d at 256.
39. Id. at 259. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decided both Gerard and the
noted case. See Haddad, 733 So. 22 at 662; Gerard, 685 So. 22 at 253.
40. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665.
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when a witness did not testify.4 ' Nevertheless, the Haddad
court concluded that there were no recent federal cases or Louisi-
ana Supreme Court cases which directly addressed the issue
presented in Haddad: is a neutralizing instruction required
when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege?4 2
Therefore, the court shifted its analysis to the jury instruc-
tions given by the trial judge in light of the requirements of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.43 The court also
noted that the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure allows
a special jury charge.44 However, the court reasoned this special
charge was not needed in this case because, when read as a
whole, the instructions were adequate to inform the members
of the jury not to draw negative inferences from Smith's refusal
to testify.45
Moreover, the court in Haddad ruled that even if the trial
court did err in failing to give the special instruction, it was
harmless error.46 The court reasoned that the jury apparently
41. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 665-66.
42. See id. at 665-67. The Haddad court did recognize the existence of the issue in Gerard,
but concluded that because the issue was waived in Gerard, it was not helpful to its analysis in
the noted case. See id at 666; see also Gerard, 685 So. 2d at 259.
43. Article 802 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the general
charge given to the jury shall be as follows:
1) As to the law applicable to the case;
2) That the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, but
that it has the duty to accept and to apply the law as given by the court; and
3) That the jury alone shall determine the weight and credibility of the evidence.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 802 (West 1998).
44. Article 807 ofthe Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in addition to the
general charges, a defendant may request special jury charges; however, a special charge need
not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge given to the jury.
See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 807 (West 1998).
45. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 666-67. In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that
the jury was adequately informed that they were only to consider the evidence presented. See
id.
46. See id An erroneousjury instruction is subject to harmless error review. See id. (citing
State v. Jynes, 652 So. 2d 91, 98 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995)), cited in Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 667;
see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1966); State v. Crossley, 653 So. 2d 631, 635-36 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995), cited in Haddad,
733 So. 2d at 666; Jynes, 652 So. 2d at 98. "The appropriate standard for determining harmless
error is 'not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered.., was surely tinattributable to
the error."' Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 667.
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found Sergeant Buckley's testimony credible and based the guilty
verdict on that testimony.47 Thus, relying on Richardson, the
court held that "the outcome of the case was not attributable
to the trial court's refusal to give a 'neutralizing' instruction"
to the jury.
4 8
In shifting its focus to the jury instructions and relying
on Richardson, the court failed to recognize facts that distinguish
Richardson from the noted case.49 In addition, the court failed
to recognize the persuasiveness of Bowles and Martin, both
of which approved of the use of a neutralizing instruction.50
The effect on a jury when the court fails to explain a wit-
ness's absence cannot and should not be ignored. 5 When a
witness for the defense or prosecution fails to testify, it can
have a seriously detrimental effect on the jury's appraisal of
the credibility of the -side that failed to produce the witness.
This effect is exacerbated when there is contradictory evidence
that only the non-testifying witness can resolve. The jury may
conclude that credibility is lacking because of the prosecution
or defense's failure to produce the witness. Thus, the question
is raised whether there was sufficient evidence to meet the
burden of proof and support the conviction.
Moreover, when the witness fails to testify, it is reasonable
to believe that at least one juror would be unable to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. As
a result, the verdict will be negatively impacted. This impact
can be reduced or even eliminated by the use of a neutralizing
instruction.
Toillustrate, in the noted case, it is likely that everyjuror
was aware that Smith was not called as a witness to testify.
Smith's name was consistently referred to throughout the trial
47. See Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 667.
48. Haddad, 733 So. 2d at 667. The court in Richardson held.there was no reasonable
possibility that a neutralizing instruction would have affected the verdict. See Richardson, 741
F.22 at 756; see also supra note 24.
49. See supra notes 5 & 24.
50. See Martin, 526 F.2d at 487; Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542.
5 1. See supra notes I1 & 20.
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by both the prosecution and the defense.52 Yet, the jury was
left to speculate why Smith was not called to testify. The failure
to produce Smith may have severely weakened the defendant's
credibility in the eyes of the jury because Smith's testimony
could have given credit to the defendant's version of the events.53
As the Supreme Court stated in Carter, the trial judge has
a powerful tool in the jury instruction, and an affirmative duty
arises to use this tool when its employment is sought to reduce
the jury's speculation. 4 Moreover, the failure to limit the jury's
speculation is an unacceptable burden on the application of
the Fifth Amendment privilege.5 5
According to jurisprudence, the Constitution guarantees
that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from exercising the
Fifth Amendment right.56 While in Carter, it was the defendant
who invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court's reason-
ing should be similarly applicable when a witness has invoked
the Fifth Amendment privilege as in Bowles, Martin and the
noted case. There is no indication that the Framers of the Con-
stitution intended to extend this guarantee only to defendants.
To the contrary, the argument that the Constitution guarantees
that negative inferences are prohibited when any person invokes
the Fifth Amendment privilege is a more reasonable assumption
of the Framer's intent. This protection extends to defendants
and witnesses, especially those key witnesses that could confirm
or deny a prosecution or defendant's account of the events.
Juries can only benefit from the use of a neutralizing in-
struction. The jury determines the credibility of witnesses.
If a witness, who is repeatedly referred to by the parties, fails
to testify, a neutralizing instruction will remind the jury that
negative inferences cannot be drawn from that witness's
absence.57 Thus, the neutralizing instruction encourages that
the jury will consider only the evidence presented.
52. See supra note 12.
53. See supra note 5.
54. See Carter, 450 U.S. at 303.
55. See id. at 305.
56. See id.
57. See Martin, 526 F.2d at 487.
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When only a non-testifying witness can resolve a fact dis-
pute, the use of a neutralizing instruction canjustify thejury's
verdict.5" There will be no question that everyjuror concluded
the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because
each juror was made aware that they are to remain neutral
in the face of a defendant's or a witness's silence. Again, it
forces the jury to weigh only the evidence presented.
In effect, the neutralizing instruction guarantees that each
party has met their burden of proof. When the request of a
neutralizing instruction is denied, there is a danger that the
jury will rely on their own speculations instead of the actual
evidence. Thus, the failure of the trial court to issue a neutraliz-
ing instruction to the jury is too important to be overlooked.5 9
The Constitution protects the individual who chooses to
remain silent and forbids negative speculation as a result of
invoking the Fifth Amendment. The major implication of the
noted case is the deprivation of that vital protection. The use
of neutralizing instructions by the trial judge is an effective
safeguard that helps to prevent the jury from relying on their
own speculation instead of the evidence. If, when a witness
has not testified, it is reasonable to believe that at least one
juror might draw a negative inference against a party, then
at the very least, a neutralizing instruction should be given.
Shaakirrah Sanders
58. See Martin, 526 F.2d at 487; Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542; Gerard, 685 So. 2d at 259.
59. See Bowles, 439 F.2d at 546 (Bazelon, J. dissenting).
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